In recent years Russia seems to take climate change more seriously. It introduced the climate change problem in National Security Strategy stating that it has negative effects for human life. President Putin also at the leaders’ summit on climate issues in April 2021 once again stressed that the fate of our planet, the development prospects of each country, the well-being and quality of life of people largely depend on the success of efforts on climate change. There are plans to create a national green certificate system (that is tested now in Sahalin) and to introduce a scheme to finance green and sustainable projects. Russian government plans to create a working group to explore options for adapting to global energy transition. And business representatives such as VEB vice-president are advocating for changes that are in line with EU goals stating that although costly the measures to make Russia’s economy greener will benefit the Russians in the end. But the question is how genuine those concerns are for Russia, what priority climate change has for the Kremlin and how ambitious the Russian climate agenda is.

Although expressing concerns over climate change, the Russian government in documents like Energy Strategy 2035 is expressing its ambition to increase the production and export of Russia oil and gas. Coal is also seen as a viable solution for export, especially in Asia. In line with this assessment Russia is investing in railroad extensions (Trans-Sib and BAM) to be able to export more coal. Not only that the Russian is investing and promoting hydrocarbon production but it is doing so in arctic sanctuaries, just recently Novatek an oil&gas firm manage to change boundaries of a protected area in order to access resources in Yamal. So, it  can be said that Russia recognized the change that climate initiatives can bring to world energy system but it tries to sell as much hydrocarbons as it can in the energy transition period. In addition, is worth mentioning that in 2020 export of hydrocarbons represented: 44.6% of all Russian exports, 28% of Russian budget and 15.8% of its GDP. The government sees the oil and gas sector as a factor of stability and pursued a raw material export model from the moment when President Putin came to power, increasing the state’s role in a domain characterized of a strategic importance. So even dough at the declaratory level Russia’s position has changed in fact the role of hydrocarbons remained predominant to the economy and still there is no statement about when this model will end.

In order to assess the priority that is given to climate change by Russia is enough to look at the National Security Strategy from 2021. In it the strategy priority is clearly given to hard security issues, economic issues and climate change is just mentioned without too much emphases. Russia has an “adaptive” approach to climate change meaning that the state will have to be able to deal with its effects (fires, floods, infrastructure deterioration) but does not tackle the causes, so a reactive model. Russia adopted a pragmatic approach because the risks associated with green reforms are greater for a conservative/averse to change Russia than the benefits of implementing a more ambitious climate agenda. Russia greenhouse gas emissions are lower than in 1990s but started to rise and as experts from the Analytical Center for the Fuel and Energy Sector of the Russian Ministry of Energy and the Situation Center remark this will pose a challenge to Russia’s image as a  climate-responsible country. Russia seems to be more preoccupied by its image, and we can see this in Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) where Russia occupied in 2020 the same 52 position as in 2021 with no change.  Due to its image concerns we ca say that external pressure will play a role in elevating the climate issues higher on Moscow’s policy agenda. Another factor that may encourage Russia to act against climate change is the facts on the ground. In the past Russia used to count the positive aspects of climate change (decreasing cost for heating, the utilization of Arctic route for transport, more arable land) and the negative aspects (fires, floods and infrastructure damage) concluding that Russia has a large and diverse territory and the zones affected by climate change are less populated so it can face climate change rather well. But in recent year the fires were far more violent affecting populated areas, permafrost melted and several incidents where oil infrastructure was damaged effected the arctic environment with oil spills in rivers. All these environmental incidents caused popular concern and Putin personally intervened to calm the population and punish an oligarch for environmental damage. Internal pressure from green NGOs and concerned population is another factor that may push the government to act on climate.  But the most effective incentive for change seems to be the proposed EU carbon border tax (CBAM) that is estimated will cost Russia 2.2 billion/year. Companies already are taking measures to reduce their emissions or to reorganize their business to mitigate as much as possible this tax. The Russian aluminum producers Rusal is going to split its operation and will create a company that will produce aluminum with low emissions that will export to EU market. So climate actions and pledges to reach net-zero taken by EU and China create a bottom up effect in Russia forcing energy exporters to take measures to adapt.

Russia climate agenda ambitions are in accordance with Paris Agreement goals. But its most important trading partner EU has a more ambitus goals aiming to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. China also (another neighbor of Russia) has stated to reach net-zero by 2060. Faced with neighbors that are aiming for net-zero Russia is pushed to aim for a reduction in emissions in order to save face and not risking to damage its image. But as mentioned by deputy chairman of government and former energy minister Alexander Novak, Russia will start with measures that are more suitable for its economy and the low hanging fruit its energy efficiency. The soviet and post-soviet model was an economy energy intensive that used abundant resources. Russia pledged to increase its energy efficiency by 30% compared to 1997. But although those measures can reduce emissions it would still not be enough and in the end coal generation and the use of hydrocarbons will have to be reduced, but Russia did not pledge to a net-zero future. The country has the potential to increase its nuclear, renewable, and hydroelectric potential and replace hydrocarbons, but to do that a political decision is needed. Oil and gas sectors were the most profitable economic sectors that  created oligarchs and powerful networks in the last 30 years that have great influence on political decisions, so it is less likely that a net-zero pledge will be made by Russia as long as those networks will have a lot to lose and there is no higher gain for them in a net-zero world. Russia’s climate ambitions are framed by its resource exporting economic model and until this model is not changed those ambitions will be lower than of EU, US or Chinese ones.

So, what the west could to is to acknowledge that a change in attitude towards climate change started in Russia due to effects of climate change on Russian territory and international initiative to move towards net-zero taken by EU and China. But Russia still needs to act and raise its ambitions and put climate action higher on the political agenda. What EU can do is to enhance its dialogue with Russia on climate issues, use the commitments that Russia already made to put pressure to act on those promises. Work with private sector in Russia to start a bottom-up climate initiative and rewards Russian companies that are reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Elaborate partnerships with Russian companies that want to develop green technologies. It is worth considering an Eurasian Green Summit with the participation of EU, Russia and China that will discuss climate issues on the Eurasian continent. In such a format Russia will face its most important buyers that pledged to reach  net-zero. Least but not last to EU should monitor under the Green Deal framework Russia’s energy producer greenhouse gas emissions this will help EU to set a proper CBAM enforcement and also to distinguish between rhetorical pirouettes that Russian officials make and actual deeds.

At the moment Lebanon is facing a political crisis, a financial crisis, a humanitarian crisis, a medical crisis and an economic crisis.  The humanitarian crisis is already a prolonged one with according to UNHCR still 1.5 million^[1] Syrian refugees with 900 thousand, of them been people of concern. At the beginning of 2020 the country was affected like the rest of the world by the COVID-19 pandemic and was struggling to contain the epidemic. The already fragile political consensus and the country’s economy was hit by an accident that happened on August 4th, 2020^[2] that destroyed a large part of Beirut port and most of its grain reserves killing 200 people and injuring 6000. The accident was the straw that broke the camel’s back and resulted in a political crisis that with the government resining and a new government was not formed to this day. Also, as a result we had a financial crisis with the national currency losing in the last 18 months more than 90% and food prices rising more than 400%. In this context several international actors tried to increase their influence in Lebanon but the most preeminent was France^[3].Iran also has a significant influence trough Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia also is an important player that used to help the country with billions of dollars but due to the political crises has stop funding Lebanon^[4].

Russia in recent years with the involvement in Syria increased its presence in the Middle East. Lebanon as a country that is bordering Syria, has access to the Mediterranean Sea and is supposed to have untapped offshore energy resources presents an interest to Russian Federation. Russia was characterized to be a pragmatic international actor that do not hesitate to capitalize if opportunities arise in order to advance its interests. So, it has an opportunistic behavior^[5]. Due to its engagement in the former Soviet Union states Russian Federation is also used with an environment where political crises and corruption are something that can be capitalized on.  It is not surprising then to see Russia increase its diplomatic activity to capitalize on this murky moment in Lebanon.

In 2021 Russia had by the end of April, fourteen (14) discussions with party leaders and Lebanon elites^[6]. The diplomatic endeavors are conducted by the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and Africa, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia M.L. Bogdanov which is a very experimented diplomat with deep knowledge and contacts in Middle East. On February 15 he had a conversation^[7] with Saad Hariri the interim prime-minister and the leader of “Mustakbal” (Future) movement, at the same day he spoke^[8] with the chairman of Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon,Waleed Jumblat. The Chairman of the Lebanese party “Marada” Suleiman Frangier called Mr. Bogdanov^[9] on 26 of February. In March Amal Abu-Zeid, adviser to the President of the Republic of Lebanon came to Moscow and had a meeting^[10] with Bogdanov. Also is worth mentioning that on March 5, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov received Mohammed Raad the chairman of the parliamentary bloc “Loyalty to Resistance” in the Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Lebanon. And most importantly the meeting in Moscow, was attended by members of the Lebanese parliament from the Hezbollah party.^[11]  During those conversation and meetings with party leaders from Lebanon the main point was the situation around the formation of the government and the help that Russia was willing to give in order to fight the pandemic, in particular providing vaccines to Lebanon. By talking with different parties and having a dialogue even with Hezballah Russia tries to increase its leverage in a uncertain situation and uses its influence (vaccines and money and the ability to have an influence on the Sirian refugee situation) as a branning chip in talks with those parties. Hezbollah stated  that “the country was “in no condition to refuse aid” regardless of politics. Russia is in a position to provide aid but the question is if there will be strings attacked. Some Russian commentators even suggest[12] that due to Iran weak economic position affected by sanctions and COVID-19 the keys to Lebanon that are in the hands of Hezbollah can be given for financial support in a time of crisis to Russia and in that way the party can help open the doors to the Lebanese government and parliament for Russia.

After those discussions we already see the prime minister Saad Hariri visiting Moscow and actively urged the Russians to invest in Lebanon. He also asked for more doses of Sputnik V vaccines to be provided to Lebanon, including to vaccinate 1.5 million Syrian refugees. A shipment of Sputnik V vaccines purchased by a private company arrived in Lebanon in March, but Beirut had previously asked Moscow to provide at least some doses of vaccines free of charge.

Beside increasing influence in a country that is important for France, Israel, Iran, South Arabia and can be used in negotiation and discussions with these players Moscow may also try to gain some economic benefits by having a more secure position among future Lebanese government. One benefit is the contract for the reconstruction of the port that was destructed in the explosion and, Russia plans to discuss with Lebanon its participation in the reconstruction of Beirut’s port and other facilities that were damaged said the Russian Ambassador to Beirut[13]. Beirut port is not the only one that Russia has an interest in. In 2019 The Lebanese Ministry of Energy has agreed to hand over for 20 years the oil product storage terminal in Tripoli to the Russian state corporation Rosneft. This port is important for Russia for several reasons: it is relatively close to the Syrian port of Tartus, where the Russian Navy’s logistical support point is located and can help with fuel and logistics, it can be used to ship oil from Kirkuk Iraq as it used to do before 1982 when the trunk oil pipeline (TPL) from Iraq through Syria was closed and Russian companies that are present in Iraq[14] may have another option to ship their oil, and last but not least the Rosneft Tripoli oil terminal may be used to try to bypass US sanctions on fuel shipments to Syria. We already see that Russia tries to secure oil transports to Syria and is escorting Iranian ships in the Mediteranean Sea[15] in order to bring oil to Syria and sources say they even set up an operational room with Iran to help Damascus[16]. The ports in Lebanon can be useful to ship more oil to Syria.

The Eastern Mediterranean resources seem to be of interest for Russia. At the end of January 2018, Lebanon signed exploration and production agreements a consortium of Russian energy firm NOVATEK (30%), Total (operator) (60%) and Eni (10%).The consortium received the right for exploration and production on Blocks 4 and 9 in the Mediterranean Sea and the drilling for exploration will start soon. Israeli analysts[17] also fear that Russia will use its stake to justify send Russian naval assets on patrol and scouting missions in the economic water of regional states, as well as to deploy them to defend gas platforms. Russia with a more secure position in Lebanon may try to gain a favorable position in regard to its plans for offshore hydrocarbon exploration in Syria because the Syrian government has a four-year contract with a Russian company for oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean that sparked concerns in Lebanon that the deal violates its maritime borders[18].

In comparison, with other countries in Middle East, Lebanon has a nascent oil and gas industry and the first companies to come will have an advantage. But in order to develop its hydrocarbon industry Lebanon needs political stability and there is an opportunity for Moscow by increasing its influence (collaborated with its grip on Syria) to obtain the stability it needs to invest more in resource extraction in the area.

In conclusion we can observe that Lebanon is starting to look more fragile and exposed and Russia has all the instrument it needs (vaccines, military, political contacts, presence in a nonboring country) and also objectives that it can obtain both economic and political, so if the opportunity arises Kremlin position itself to be able to fish in Lebanon murky waters.

[1] https://reporting.unhcr.org/lebanon

[2] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/5/beirut-blast-tracing-the-explosives-that-tore-the-capital-apart

[3] https://www.reuters.com/article/lebanon-crisis-france-int-idUSKBN29Y26A

[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-lebanon-aid-idUSKBN1W31JW

[5] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236.pdf p.10

[6] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb?currentpage=main-country

[7] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4574058

[8] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4574068

[9] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4600858

[10] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4607271

[11] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4632878

[12] https://russian.rt.com/opinion/854426-yuzik-iran-livan

[13] https://iz.ru/1122956/2021-02-10/rossiia-namerena-obsudit-s-livanom-uchastie-v-vosstanovlenii-porta-beiruta

[14] https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-pours-money-iraqi-oilfields/

[15] https://news.usni.org/2020/10/21/russian-navy-seen-escorting-iranian-tankers-bound-for-syria

[16] https://en.mehrnews.com/news/172235/Iran-Russia-Syria-set-up-operational-room-to-help-Damascus

[17] https://www.jpost.com/opinion/what-does-russia-want-with-lebanons-gas-fields-630557

[18] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-lebanon-russia-oil-gas-exploration-deal-maritime-dispute

For the Black Sea and its energy security the important period to look for is the medium term 5-10 years, and to try to foresee what dangers and possibilities arise for the countries during this time frame. The medium-term perspective is important for several reasons: it is the period that will be crucial for implementing the start of energy transition that will define their future in a net-zero world, Russia as a hydrocarbon energy power is more prone to act in order to secure advantages before 2030 and a medium-term framework is still in the realm of actual budgets and current initiatives that can have an influence in the region.

Coping with green policies

Countries that are in the EU (Bulgaria, Romania) will have to cut emissions according to EU strategy by 55% till 2030. In order to achieve this target and also due to increase costs of carbon both countries will have to cut coal power generation (in Romania representing 24%, Bulgaria 40% of energy generation,Ukraine 31.2%). The question remains what will replace coal? It can be either renewables sources, gas or nuclear. Bulgaria has signed an MoU with US for a Nuclear Power Plant and Romania signed a contract to build a nuclear reactor. But the new capacities will not be expected to be ready before 2028-2030. Romania and Bulgaria increased their renewable sources, but the target is not what EU expects (Romania proposed a 30%, Bulgaria-27.09% but not what EU wants 35%). One way to replace coal would be to use gas as a transition fuel in a 5-10year period and then decrease its use till 2050. Bulgaria does not have significant gas reserves, prospects for its offshore perimeters did not had positive results and it will have to rely on imports. Romania on the other hand found gas in its offshore Neptune Deep perimeter (42-80bcm), but the production will start in the most optimistic scenario in 2027. In the meantime, Romania gas production is declining by 10%/y and is expected to rely on 40% imports in 2030 if the Neptune Deep resources are not commercialized. Ukraine although not in the EU will try to reduce its carbon emissions in order to prove it is western oriented and a responsible international actor. But with no new nuclear power plant in project and not a sufficient boost in renewables it will probably use gas to reduce emissions in medium-term. And given the fact that gas consumption in Ukraine declined in line with decrease in economic activity from 2014 onward, it can be expected an increase in consumption if the economy rebounds and hopefully will grow. Ukraine also faces a more challenging situation where Russia could be in a position to cut its transit trough Ukraine after the construction of NS2, an action that will increase the cost of gas for Ukraine not been able to use virtual reverse flow and also to affect its economic viability of its transport system. In order to mitigate such a scenario Ukraine already is looking for western partners and signed MoU with OMV_Petrom (Romania), PGNiG (Poland) and Naphtha Israel to develop its domestic gas reserves. Armenia with its NPP in a condition that will require to be closed  and not enough resources to invest in renewables will have to increase its gas imports from Russia to fulfill its energy needs, Armenian president even ask Russia for help to build another nuclear power plant. Georgia became a net electricity importer from 2019, it imports its energy from Azerbaijan or Russia. Another factor that will affect domestic electricity generation is due to climate change that is altering the water availability of rivers and implicitly can decrease hydropower generation. Given the fact that the future net-zero world will increase electricity consumption Georgia needs to develop and diversify further its domestic electricity production in order not to become dependent on Russia for energy imports. From the region Turkey is the most developed energy market due to its historic dependency it implemented policies to diversify both its sources and routes. Turkey diversified its routes and sources of gas import (pipeline and LNG), invested in wind and hydropower and is also building a nuclear power plant, and just recently announced another discovery in the Sakarya field increasing the findings to 540 billion cubic meters. Turkey desire is to tap the gas in the Black See as soon as 2023.  But without western technology or partners the 2023 is a very optimistic term, and at the moment Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO) is looking for partners to develop the Black Sea field, among the possible participants been US firms like Exxon Mobile or Chevrom. Turkey could be a source of gas exports in the region, but it has to open its market for exports and to create a viable gas hub.

Russia and its perspective in the region in medium-term

Russia betted on hydrocarbons and the use of gas as a transition fuel till 2030 and beyond. In accordance with this view developed projects that will enhance its presence in the Black Sea area and will allow to sell more gas and have more leverage in negotiations due to alternative routes of supply.  In order to achieve its objectives constructed the Turks Stream (on shore and offshore parts) and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. In Romania in medium-term as we mentioned above without offshore exploration and with nuclear power plants not constructed there is a possibility of 40% import of gas and most of it will come from Gazprom trough Turk Stream. Already in 2021 we saw an increase of Russian gas imports and Romania paid one of the highest prices in Europe in 2020 to Gazprom. In an scenario where gas is used as transition fuel, Bulgaria although it manage to receive gas from Azerbaijan trough TAP pipeline will still rely on Russian gas and most importantly Bulgaria remained a transit country for Russian gas to Romania, Serbia and soon to Hungary so its reliance on transit fees from Gazprom is still present in a different form. In Ukraine with the construction of Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream in the next decade Gazprom will have the possibility to cut the transit trough the country and leave Ukraine without transit fees and with expensive gas imports in a medium-term perspective. In Armenia Russia has total control over the energy sector and the situation is likely to remain the same. Turkey although managed in a clever way by domestic production of electricity and diversification of sources of gas import to decrease Gazprom influence, it is building a nuclear power plant (Akkuyyu) with Rosatom in a built-own-operate (BOO) framework. As a result Russia influence decreased over gas affairs but will increase in the electricity sector with the Akkuyyu expected to provide (10%) of Turkey energy. The power plant will be owned and operated by Rosatom and also a port terminal will be constructed to be operated by Rosatom in Mediterana. It is worth mentioning that 70% of energy will be at a preferential price (Russia used electricity price to influence policy in Armenia). Given the fact that in a time frame beyond 2030 the need for hydrocarbons is expected to drop as the region will go to a net-zero world, Gazprom is expected to use all its leverage to extract as much benefit as it can from the riverain courtiers in a medium-term perspective especially if those countries will be in a position where they will have to use gas imports to meet their climate and energy needs.

What is to be done

            Accelerate the passe of current projects in the nuclear field. EU should work with US to facilitate the implementation of those projects. Support domestic gas production in Romania, Ukraine and Turkey that need technology to develop their resources. Use current infrastructure and apply EU law to create a more effective regional market. Finish interconnectors like Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) and use US initiative for infrastructure and 3 Seas Initiative for common projects to facilitate further flow of gas in the region from LNG terminals in Greece, Turkey, Croatia, Poland to Black Sea riverain countries. Encourage investment in renewable energy in the region like offshore wind and solar. All those are already measures in reach, but the pace of implementation needs to be increased in order to avoid the risk to have a mid-term period (2023-2030) where Russian gas will be the solution to meet energy and climate needs in the Black Sea region and solve the problems that were not dealt in a timely manner.