Fishing in murky waters Russia and Lebanon

June 20, 2021

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At the moment Lebanon is facing a political crisis, a financial crisis, a humanitarian crisis, a medical crisis and an economic crisis. The humanitarian crisis is already a prolonged one with according to UNHCR still 1.5 million^[1] Syrian refugees with 900 thousand, of them been people of concern. At the beginning of 2020 the country was affected like the rest of the world by the COVID-19 pandemic and was struggling to contain the epidemic. The already fragile political consensus and the country’s economy was hit by an accident that happened on August 4th, 2020^[2] that destroyed a large part of Beirut port and most of its grain reserves killing 200 people and injuring 6000. The accident was the straw that broke the camel’s back and resulted in a political crisis that with the government resining and a new government was not formed to this day. Also, as a result we had a financial crisis with the national currency losing in the last 18 months more than 90% and food prices rising more than 400%. In this context several international actors tried to increase their influence in Lebanon but the most preeminent was France^[3].Iran also has a significant influence trough Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia also is an important player that used to help the country with billions of dollars but due to the political crises has stop funding Lebanon^[4].

Russia in recent years with the involvement in Syria increased its presence in the Middle East. Lebanon as a country that is bordering Syria, has access to the Mediterranean Sea and is supposed to have untapped offshore energy resources presents an interest to Russian Federation. Russia was characterized to be a pragmatic international actor that do not hesitate to capitalize if opportunities arise in order to advance its interests. So, it has an opportunistic behavior^[5]. Due to its engagement in the former Soviet Union states Russian Federation is also used with an environment where political crises and corruption are something that can be capitalized on. It is not surprising then to see Russia increase its diplomatic activity to capitalize on this murky moment in Lebanon.

In 2021 Russia had by the end of April, fourteen (14) discussions with party leaders and Lebanon elites^[6]. The diplomatic endeavors are conducted by the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and Africa, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia M.L. Bogdanov which is a very experimented diplomat with deep knowledge and contacts in Middle East. On February 15 he had a conversation^[7] with Saad Hariri the interim prime-minister and the leader of “Mustakbal” (Future) movement, at the same day he spoke^[8] with the chairman of Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon,Waleed Jumblat. The Chairman of the Lebanese party “Marada” Suleiman Frangier called Mr. Bogdanov^[9] on 26 of February. In March Amal Abu-Zeid, adviser to the President of the Republic of Lebanon came to Moscow and had a meeting^[10] with Bogdanov. Also is worth mentioning that on March 5, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov received Mohammed Raad the chairman of the parliamentary bloc “Loyalty to Resistance” in the Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Lebanon. And most importantly the meeting in Moscow, was attended by members of the Lebanese parliament from the Hezbollah party.^[11] During those conversation and meetings with party leaders from Lebanon the main point was the situation around the formation of the government and the help that Russia was willing to give in order to fight the pandemic, in particular providing vaccines to Lebanon. By talking with different parties and having a dialogue even with Hezballah Russia tries to increase its leverage in a uncertain situation and uses its influence (vaccines and money and the ability to have an influence on the Sirian refugee situation) as a branning chip in talks with those parties. Hezbollah stated that “the country was “in no condition to refuse aid” regardless of politics. Russia is in a position to provide aid but the question is if there will be strings attacked. Some Russian commentators even suggest[12] that due to Iran weak economic position affected by sanctions and COVID-19 the keys to Lebanon that are in the hands of Hezbollah can be given for financial support in a time of crisis to Russia and in that way the party can help open the doors to the Lebanese government and parliament for Russia.

After those discussions we already see the prime minister Saad Hariri visiting Moscow and actively urged the Russians to invest in Lebanon. He also asked for more doses of Sputnik V vaccines to be provided to Lebanon, including to vaccinate 1.5 million Syrian refugees. A shipment of Sputnik V vaccines purchased by a private company arrived in Lebanon in March, but Beirut had previously asked Moscow to provide at least some doses of vaccines free of charge.

Beside increasing influence in a country that is important for France, Israel, Iran, South Arabia and can be used in negotiation and discussions with these players Moscow may also try to gain some economic benefits by having a more secure position among future Lebanese government. One benefit is the contract for the reconstruction of the port that was destructed in the explosion and, Russia plans to discuss with Lebanon its participation in the reconstruction of Beirut’s port and other facilities that were damaged said the Russian Ambassador to Beirut[13]. Beirut port is not the only one that Russia has an interest in. In 2019 The Lebanese Ministry of Energy has agreed to hand over for 20 years the oil product storage terminal in Tripoli to the Russian state corporation Rosneft. This port is important for Russia for several reasons: it is relatively close to the Syrian port of Tartus, where the Russian Navy’s logistical support point is located and can help with fuel and logistics, it can be used to ship oil from Kirkuk Iraq as it used to do before 1982 when the trunk oil pipeline (TPL) from Iraq through Syria was closed and Russian companies that are present in Iraq[14] may have another option to ship their oil, and last but not least the Rosneft Tripoli oil terminal may be used to try to bypass US sanctions on fuel shipments to Syria. We already see that Russia tries to secure oil transports to Syria and is escorting Iranian ships in the Mediteranean Sea[15] in order to bring oil to Syria and sources say they even set up an operational room with Iran to help Damascus[16]. The ports in Lebanon can be useful to ship more oil to Syria.

The Eastern Mediterranean resources seem to be of interest for Russia. At the end of January 2018, Lebanon signed exploration and production agreements a consortium of Russian energy firm NOVATEK (30%), Total (operator) (60%) and Eni (10%).The consortium received the right for exploration and production on Blocks 4 and 9 in the Mediterranean Sea and the drilling for exploration will start soon. Israeli analysts[17] also fear that Russia will use its stake to justify send Russian naval assets on patrol and scouting missions in the economic water of regional states, as well as to deploy them to defend gas platforms. Russia with a more secure position in Lebanon may try to gain a favorable position in regard to its plans for offshore hydrocarbon exploration in Syria because the Syrian government has a four-year contract with a Russian company for oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean that sparked concerns in Lebanon that the deal violates its maritime borders[18].

In comparison, with other countries in Middle East, Lebanon has a nascent oil and gas industry and the first companies to come will have an advantage. But in order to develop its hydrocarbon industry Lebanon needs political stability and there is an opportunity for Moscow by increasing its influence (collaborated with its grip on Syria) to obtain the stability it needs to invest more in resource extraction in the area.

In conclusion we can observe that Lebanon is starting to look more fragile and exposed and Russia has all the instrument it needs (vaccines, military, political contacts, presence in a nonboring country) and also objectives that it can obtain both economic and political, so if the opportunity arises Kremlin position itself to be able to fish in Lebanon murky waters.

[1] https://reporting.unhcr.org/lebanon

[2] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/5/beirut-blast-tracing-the-explosives-that-tore-the-capital-apart

[3] https://www.reuters.com/article/lebanon-crisis-france-int-idUSKBN29Y26A

[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-lebanon-aid-idUSKBN1W31JW

[5] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236.pdf p.10

[6] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb?currentpage=main-country

[7] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4574058

[8] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4574068

[9] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4600858

[10] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4607271

[11] https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/lb/-/asset_publisher/YIYV5tIrcKpw/content/id/4632878

[12] https://russian.rt.com/opinion/854426-yuzik-iran-livan